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       Office of the Attorney General 
        of New Jersey 
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        ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
Several New Jersey individual chiropractors and 
professional organizations that represent chiropractors 
appeal from the district court's dismissal of their complaint 
on the basis of abstention under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 
U.S. 315 (1943). They contend that the district court 
should have adjudicated their federal constitutional 
challenge to certain regulations of New Jersey's 
comprehensive no-fault automobile insurance law. The 
regulations were promulgated by Appellee Jaynee 
LaVecchia, Commissioner of the Department of Banking 
and Insurance. We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
On May 19, 1998, in an attempt to reduce escalating 
automobile insurance costs in the state, the Legislature of 
the State of New Jersey enacted the Automobile Insurance 
Cost Reduction Act (the "Act"). The Act substantially 
restructured New Jersey's method of providing no-fault 
insurance benefits to automobile accident victims. This was 
an amendment of the state's 1972 no-fault insurance law, 
which previously had been amended in 1983, 1988 and 
1990. The new Act was the result of the Legislature's 
determination 
 
       that the substantial increase in the cost of medical 
       expense benefits indicate[d] that the benefits [were] 
       being over utilized for the purpose of gaining standing 
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       to sue for pain and suffering, . . . necessitating the 
       imposition of further controls on the use of those 
       benefits, including the establishment of a basis for 
       determining whether treatments or diagnostic tests are 
       medically necessary. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 39:6A-1.1. Thus, the Act states in relevant 
part: 
 
       Benefits provided under basic coverage shall be in 
       accordance with a benefit plan provided in the policy 
       and approved by the commissioner. The policy form, 
       which shall be subject to the approval of the 
       commissioner, shall set forth the benefits provided 
       under the policy, including eligible medical treatments, 
       diagnostic tests and services as well as such other 
       benefits as the policy may provide. The commissioner 
       shall set forth by regulation a statement of the basic 
       benefits which shall be included in the policy. Medical 
       treatments, diagnostic tests, and services provided by 
       the policy shall be rendered in accordance with 
       commonly accepted protocols and professional 
       standards and practices which are commonly accepted 
       as being beneficial for the treatment of the covered 
       injury. . . . Protocols shall be deemed to establish 
       guidelines as to standard appropriate treatment and 
       diagnostic tests for injuries sustained in automobile 
       accidents, but the establishment of standard treatment 
       protocols or protocols for the administration of 
       diagnostic tests shall not be interpreted in a [sic] such 
       a manner as to preclude variance from the standard 
       when warranted by reason of medical necessity. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 39:6A-3.1(4)(a). "Medical necessity" exists 
when treatment of the particular injury "(1) is not primarily 
for the convenience of the injured person or provider, (2) is 
the most appropriate standard or level or service which is 
in accordance with standards of good practice and standard 
professional treatment protocols . . . and (3) does not 
involve unnecessary diagnostic testing." N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 39:6A-2m. 
 
The precise constitutional attack lodged by these 
Appellants concentrates on six so-called "care paths" in the 
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comprehensive regulations developed by the Commissioner 
with the assistance of PricewaterhouseCoopers. These care 
paths are a set of protocols and standard treatments and 
practices for specific diagnosed back injuries. Each care 
path designates the appropriate treatment for particular 
back injuries that can be reimbursed absent a showing of 
medical necessity. See N.J. Admin. CodeS 11:3-4. The 
regulations also include an arbitration mechanism for 
resolution of disputes concerning the medical necessity of 
treatment that deviates from or exceeds that which has 
been delineated in the care paths. 
 
On September 8, 1998, the Commissioner published the 
proposed regulations, see 30 N.J. Reg. 3211, and received 
comments from the public through November 4, 1998. On 
November 4, 1998, the Commissioner held a public hearing 
to receive testimony concerning the proposed regulations. 
Representatives of health care providers, including 
chiropractic associations, attorneys and insurers, 
submitted written comments to the proposed regulations 
and presented testimony at the public hearing. Appellants 
stated that the care paths were "ill-conceived, detrimental 
to patient care, and dangerous." 
 
After making minor modifications to the proposed 
regulations, the Commissioner signed the regulations for 
adoption on November 30, 1998. These modified 
regulations were scheduled to become operative on March 
22, 1999. See 30 N.J. Reg. 4401(a). 
 
Appellants filed their initial complaint in the district 
court on November 4, 1998, before the Commissioner 
adopted the regulations. After the regulations were adopted, 
three appeals challenging the regulations were filed in the 
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, one by 
physicians and other health care professionals and two by 
trial lawyers associations. Thereafter, in their first amended 
complaint filed in the District Court on January 12, 1999, 
Appellants alleged that the regulations violated their 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process, 
procedural due process and equal protection rights. Before 
us, Appellants explain: 
 
       The final regulations contain only two changes 
       concerning chiropractic care that are relevant to this 
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       lawsuit. First, chiropractors can now treat auto 
       accident victims with no serious injuries, (i.e. sprains 
       and strains under care paths one, three and five for up 
       to twelve visits during the first months....) 
 
       The final regulations state that chiropractors can treat 
       patients with radiculopathy or herniated discs, (i.e. 
       patients who fall under care paths two, four and six) as 
       long as they have no positive or objective findings for 
       either conditions. 
 
Appellants' Brief at 5. 
 
The First Amended Complaint alleged that the care paths 
eliminate the availability of reimbursable chiropractic care 
for victims of automobile accidents and severely restrict the 
number of reimbursable chiropractic care visits allowed in 
the first month following an automobile accident. 
Appellants based their substantive due process and equal 
protection claims on assertions that the care path 
provisions were arbitrary and capricious and were not 
rationally related to the legitimate aim of the enabling 
legislation. See App. at 50-51. As to their procedural due 
process count, Appellants contended that the regulations' 
arbitration provisions "den[ied] health care practitioners 
any practical right to contest the medical treatment 
judgments of the [personal injury protection benefits] 
carriers." App. at 52. Appellants sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief. 
 
On the very next day, January 13, 1999, Appellants filed 
an appeal in the New Jersey Superior Court that sets forth 
issues similar to those contained in the appeals of the 
health care professionals. Both of these appeals are now 
pending before the New Jersey Superior Court, and 
challenge the regulations as being beyond the scope of the 
Department of Banking and Industry, and as establishing 
rigid care paths and treatment mandates contrary to 
accepted standards of medical care. They contend that the 
regulations unreasonably substitute the agency's dictates 
for professional medical judgment of the injured person's 
physician by specifying the precise care to be provided. 
They contend also that the agency has acted in a manner 
inconsistent with the enabling legislation. See S.A. at 128, 
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139. All three groups of Appellants--health care 
professionals and physicians, attorneys and chiropractors-- 
contend in these appeals that the regulations were adopted 
without appropriate consultation with national and state 
standard-setting for professional organizations. See S.A. at 
128, 130, 139. 
 
The district court abstained from ruling on Appellants' 
federal constitutional claims on the basis of Burford, and 
dismissed Appellants' First Amended Complaint. We have 
jurisdiction to consider the present appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. Regarding a district court's abstention 
decision, our review of the underlying legal questions is 
plenary, but we review the decision to abstain for abuse of 
discretion. See Trent v. Dial Medical of Fla., Inc., 33 F.3d 
217, 223 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
II. 
 
At least since 1941, in Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. 
Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941), the federal courts have 
recognized circumstances under which they will decline to 
adjudicate cases even though they have jurisdiction under 
the Constitution and statutes. These circumstances are 
loosely gathered under discrete concepts of abstention 
named after leading Supreme Court cases. The Court has 
said: "The various types of abstention are not rigid 
pigeonholes into which federal courts must try to fit cases. 
Rather, they reflect a complex of consideration designed to 
soften the tensions inherent in a system that contemplates 
parallel judicial processes." Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 
U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987). 
 
Abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction, however, is 
the exception rather than the rule. Colorado River Water 
Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 
(1976). Nevertheless, abstention is firmly rooted. 
 
Several reasons are assigned for withholding the exercise 
of jurisdiction. Abstention is recognized to avoid deciding a 
federal constitutional question when the case may be 
disposed on questions of state law, Pullman; to avoid 
needless conflict with the administration by a state of its 
own affairs, Burford; to leave to the states the resolution of 
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unsettled questions of state law, Louisiana Power & Light 
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); to avoid 
duplicative litigation, Colorado River. In addition, the 
doctrine of "Our Federalism" teaches that federal courts 
must refrain from hearing constitutional challenges to state 
action under certain circumstances in which federal action 
is regarded as an improper intrusion on the right of a state 
to enforce its own laws in its own courts, Younger v. Harris, 
401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
 
At the risk of over-simplification, we can say that these 
reasons come within the rubric of comity, or the idea "that 
certain matters are of state concern to the point where 
federal courts should hesitate to intrude; and they may also 
concern judicial `economy,' the notion that courts should 
avoid making duplicate efforts or unnecessarily deciding 
difficult questions." Bath Memorial Hosp. v. Maine Health 
Care Fin. Comm'n, 853 F.2d 1007, 1012 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 
We will affirm the district court's judgment on the basis 
of Burford abstention. We conclude that the Act and the 
regulations promulgated by the Commissioner represent a 
complex legislative and regulatory package designed to 
reform automobile insurance law in New Jersey, and that 
the courts of New Jersey are in the best position to consider 
the validity of the applicable regulations under state law, 
and can do so without having to examine the constitutional 
questions that have been raised by Appellants. "It is 
particularly desirable to decline to exercise equity 
jurisdiction when the result is to permit a state court to 
have an opportunity to determine questions of state law 
which may prevent the necessity of decision on a 
constitutional question." Burford, 319 U.S. at 333 n.29 
(citing Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168, 173 
(1942)).1 Thus, Burford clearly allows a federal court, in fact 
urges a federal court, to decline to exercise jurisdiction 
when adjudication of questions of state law (which can only 
be done by state courts) may avert the need to delve into 
constitutional issues like those presented here. This case 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The quoted language of Burford and Fieldcrest Dairies bears a strong 
resemblance to the Court's language in Pullman, thereby exhibiting how 
the various doctrines are not "rigid pigeonholes." 
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fits comfortably into the scheme envisioned by the Burford 
Court. 
 
In Burford, the Supreme Court stated that a federal court 
should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in a manner that 
would interfere with a state's efforts to regulate an area of 
law in which state interests predominate and in which 
adequate and timely state review of the regulatory scheme 
is available. See 319 U.S. at 332-334. The purpose of 
Burford abstention has been articulated by this court: " `to 
avoid federal intrusion into matters of local concern and 
which are within the special competence of local courts.' " 
Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Util. 
Comm'n, 791 F.2d 1111, 1115 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting 
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
614 F.2d 206, 212 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also Meredith v. 
Talbot Cty., Md., 828 F.2d 228, 231 (4th Cir. 1987) ("The 
underlying purpose of Burford abstention is to enable 
federal courts to avoid needless conflict with the 
administration by a state of its own affairs."); 17A Wright, 
Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Jurisdiction S 4243. 
 
Recently the Supreme Court provided a clear definition of 
the Burford doctrine: 
 
       Where timely and adequate state-court review is 
       available, a federal court sitting in equity must decline 
       to interfere with the proceedings or orders of state 
       administrative agencies: (1) when there are "difficult 
       questions of state law bearing on policy problems of 
       substantial public import whose importance 
       transcends the result in the case then at bar"; or (2) 
       where the "exercise of federal review of the question in 
       a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state 
       efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a 
       matter of substantial public concern." 
 
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New 
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (quoting Colorado River, 
424 U.S. at 814). It is from this definition that we 
determine that the district court acted properly when it 
dismissed Appellants' First Amended Complaint. 
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A. 
 
We begin with an analysis of whether timely and 
adequate state-court review is available, for "[o]nly if [the 
court] determines that such review is available, should it 
turn to the other issues." Riley v. Simmons, 45 F.3d 764, 
771 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Timely and adequate state-court review has been and 
continues to be available to Appellants. New Jersey law 
provides that a party may take an appeal as of right to the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, for review 
of a final action of any state administrative agency or officer 
and for review of the validity of any rule promulgated by 
any state agency or officer. See N.J. Court Rule 2:2-3(a)(2). 
Appellants and three other groups of litigants havefiled 
such an appeal of the regulations promulgated by the 
Commissioner pursuant to the Act. 
 
Appellants contend that the state-court proceeding could 
not provide timely and adequate review because the 
Appellate Division would have been unable to resolve the 
appeal prior to the regulations' March 22, 1999 effective 
date. Appellants also contend that the Appellate Division 
would not provide them with adequate relief because that 
court could not hold an evidentiary hearing. Both 
arguments fail. 
 
First, the Appellate Division has the authority to 
accelerate the usual briefing and oral argument schedule, 
and is empowered to stay agency action pending appeal. 
See N.J. Court Rule 2:9-7. Further, if the Appellate Division 
declines its authority to stay the agency action, a party may 
submit an application for a stay with the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey "when necessary to prevent irreparable injury." 
N.J. Court Rule 2:2-2. Therefore, the Appellate Division had 
the ability to expedite the proceedings in order to rule on 
the validity of the regulations at issue here prior to March 
22, 1999, or at least stay their enforcement until a ruling 
is issued. 
 
Second, Appellants incorrectly assert that the Appellate 
Division is without power to hold an evidentiary hearing. 
New Jersey court rules permit supplementation of the 
record on appeal, including the presentation of live 
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witnesses before a specially designated judge of the New 
Jersey Superior Court. See N.J. Court Rule 2:5-5(b). 
Further, testimony presented by Appellants during the 
public hearing on November 4, 1998, as well as documents 
filed during the public comment period, became part of the 
record to be considered by the Appellate Division. 
 
Appellants have not demonstrated the absence of timely 
and adequate state-court review in this matter. We 
therefore turn to the question of whether a federal court's 
adjudication of Appellants' claims would interfere with New 
Jersey's efforts to implement a policy concerning no-fault 
insurance law. 
 
B. 
 
The district court held, and we agree, that the second 
prong of the Burford doctrine, as laid out in New Orleans 
Public Service, supra, is applicable here. This prong of 
Burford requires us to examine three issues: (1) whether 
the particular regulatory scheme involves a matter of 
substantial public concern, (2) whether it is "the sort of 
complex, technical regulatory scheme to which the Burford 
abstention doctrine usually is applied," Felmeister v. Office 
of Attorney Ethics, 856 F.2d 529, 534 (3d Cir. 1988), and 
(3) whether federal review of a party's claims would 
interfere with the state's efforts to establish and maintain a 
coherent regulatory policy. See New Orleans Public Serv., 
491 U.S. at 361. All three issues can be answered in the 
affirmative. 
 
There can be no doubt that a state's efforts to curtail the 
skyrocketing costs of automobile insurance premiums 
within its borders present a matter of substantial public 
concern. New Jersey's dubious notoriety for "out-of-control" 
automobile insurance premiums has been well-documented 
and has reflected negatively on the state. See , e.g., Thomas 
Ginsburg, NJ Auto Insurance Up 8% in `96, The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, Feb. 12, 1998, at A1; Robert Schwaneberg, 
Insurers, Legislators Blame Car Premium Mess on Each 
Other, The Star-Ledger, Feb. 5, 1998, at 31; John Kolesar, 
Stuck in the Middle of the Road: The Legislature's Failure to 
Adopt True No-Fault Insurance has Permitted Jerseyans to 
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be Run Over by High Rates, The Star-Ledger, Nov. 23, 1997, 
at 1; Sharon Tennyson, The Impact of Rate Regulation on 
State Automobile Insurance Markets, 15 J. Ins. Reg. 502 
(July 1, 1997). Since 1972, the New Jersey legislature has 
attempted to refine its no-fault insurance law in order to 
create a scheme that will serve New Jersey drivers and their 
passengers, insurers, health care service providers and 
those who represent them. The Act and the regulations 
promulgated by the Commissioner clearly pertain to a 
matter in which the state has a substantial and important 
interest. 
 
Additionally, a review of the Act and the regulations 
establishes that we are presented with a complex regulatory 
scheme for purposes of Burford abstention. The Legislature 
and the Commissioner have promulgated all-encompassing, 
highly technical, extremely intertwined and interrelated 
provisions that describe the extent of reimbursable medical 
treatment, applicable deductibles and co-pays and accepted 
medical protocols. The regulations include detailedflow 
charts of the accepted care paths. There is a delineated 
dispute mechanism in place for accident victims who seek 
reimbursement for treatments that deviate from the care 
paths. There can be no doubt that the Act and regulations 
at issue here constitute a complex regulatory solution to 
the state's no-fault insurance problem. 
 
Thus, we are left to examine whether federal review of 
Appellants' constitutional claims would interfere with New 
Jersey's efforts to establish and maintain a coherent 
regulatory policy. We believe that " `the regulatory system 
[has] as a central purpose uniformity to achieve important 
local interests that would be frustrated by federal court 
review.' " University of Md. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 
F.2d 265, 272 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Federal Jurisdiction 112 (Supp. 1990)). The cases relied 
upon by Appellants present distinguishable factual 
scenarios from the one presented here, and lend further 
support for our holding. 
 
The Act and regulations are aimed at reducing the high 
cost of automobile insurance in New Jersey. The State of 
New Jersey sought to achieve this goal by revising 
reimbursement standards for first-party, no-fault personal 
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injury protection medical expense benefits. The regulations 
address reimbursement for nearly all medical providers who 
treat automobile accident victims. 
 
Thus, a court conducting a review of Appellants' due 
process and equal protection claims would have to examine 
the purpose of the Act, and determine whether the 
regulations conformed with the New Jersey Legislature's 
intent and whether the regulations singled out 
chiropractors and their patients for unfair treatment. 
Clearly, the regulations would be subject to rational 
basis/arbitrary and capricious examination in either 
sovereign's court. See Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. 
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-286 
(1974) (agency action that does not implicate fundamental 
rights or suspect classes is subject to arbitrary and 
capricious review in which court examines whether there is 
rational basis for agency's action); Brady v. Department of 
Personnel, 693 A.2d 466, 472 (N.J. 1997) (review of state 
regulatory policy subject to arbitrary and capricious 
standard); Beattystown Community Council v. Department of 
Environmental Protection, 712 A.2d 1170, 1176 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1998) (same). Because Appellants, and three 
other groups of plaintiffs, have presented an "arbitrary and 
capricious" argument to the Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Appellate Division, review by this court, or any federal 
court, at this time would interfere significantly with New 
Jersey's efforts to establish and maintain a coherent 
automobile insurance regulatory policy. See Alabama Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Railway, 341 U.S. 341, 349 
(1951) ("As adequate state court review of an administrative 
order based upon predominantly local factors is available 
. . . intervention of a federal court is not necessary for the 
protection of federal rights.") (footnote omitted). Although 
Appellants have not raised Fourteenth Amendment claims 
before the Appellate Division, that court would have to 
conduct the same form of "arbitrary and capricious" review 
to resolve Appellants' state court allegations. The Appellate 
Division's scope of review under New Jersey Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) 
involves an examination of: "(1) whether the agency's action 
violates the express or implied legislative policies, that is, 
did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record 
contains substantial evidence to support the findings on 
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which the agency bases its action; and (3) whether, in 
applying legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly 
erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably 
have been made on a showing of the relevant factors." 
Matter of Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996). Appellants' 
federal suit is thus entangled in a "skein of state law." New 
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 361. 
 
The district court recognized the problem: 
 
       As in Marx [v. Snedecker, 612 F. Supp. 1148 (D.N.J. 
       1985)], analysis of the constitutional questions raised 
       in this case would involve an in-depth analysis of the 
       legislative purposes of AICRA, a major reform effort in 
       an area of law--automobile insurance--that has 
       typically been left to the states to regulate. See Lac 
       D'Amiante du Quebec v. American Home Assurance Co., 
       864 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (3d Cir. 1988) ("the states 
       have assumed the primary role in regulating 
       insurance"). This case requires an analysis of whether 
       the challenged regulations, as they apply to 
       chiropractors and their patients, are consistent with 
       the Legislature's attempt in enacting AICRA to reform 
       New Jersey's comprehensive no-fault automobile 
       insurance law so as to reduce the high cost of 
       automobile insurance in New Jersey, or whether 
       chiropractors and their patients have been unfairly 
       singled out for unfavorable treatment. The outcome of 
       this inquiry turns upon an assessment of the 
       rationality of the basis for the regulations, which 
       involves an examination of the administrative 
       procedure and the substantive result of the state 
       regulatory scheme. Unlike in cases where the state 
       regulations under constitutional review were enacted to 
       comply with a federal mandate in the particular 
       regulatory field, see, e.g., New Jersey Hospital Assoc. v. 
       Waldman, 73 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 1995) (involving a due 
       process challenge to a state agency's reduction in 
       Medicaid reimbursement rates mandated by the Boran 
       Amendments to the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 
       S 1396(a)(13)(A)), there is no federal interest in the 
       regulation of automobile insurance, an area in which 
       Congress has deferred to the states. See Lac 
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       D'Amiante, 864 F.2d at 1038-39 (discussing the 
       McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. SS 1011-15, which 
       provides for exclusive state regulation of the business 
       of insurance). 
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 20-21, reprinted in App. at 23-24. 
 
III. 
 
That the Appellants have raised federal constitutional 
challenges to the regulations does not affect our analysis. 
We do not consider the teachings of Bath Mem. Hosp. v. 
Maine Health and Fin. Comm'n, 853 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 
1988), to compel a different result. In that case there was 
facial attack on the constitutionality of a statute that 
regulated hospital charges. Such an attack is not present 
here. Speaking for the court, then-Judge Breyer explained 
that the Bath plaintiffs: 
 
       do not seek individualized fact- (or cost-) specific 
       regulatory decision making. To the contrary, they 
       attack the statute as it is written. Permitting a federal 
       court to decide this kind of constitutional claim would 
       not interfere with the workings of a lawful state 
       system, as such intervention threatened in Burford, 
       Alabama P.S.C., or [Allstate Insurance Co. v.] Sabbagh[, 
       603 F.2d 228 (1st Cir. 1979)]. Review here would not 
       threaten to create in the federal court a parallel 
       regulatory review institution. The risks of interference 
       here seem no greater than those present whenever a 
       federal court decides whether a state regulatory statute 
       is constitutional. 
 
853 F. 2d at 1014-1015. 
 
In contrast with the circumstances in Bath, the 
Appellants here do indeed seek individualized fact-specific 
regulatory decision making. They do not attack the statute 
as written; they attack only discrete portions of regulations 
promulgated by the Commissioner, not the legislature, and 
review here would certainly create in the federal court a 
parallel regulatory review institution. The very factors that 
were not present in Bath to militate against applying 
Burford are unmistakably present in the case at bar. They 
plainly call for the application of abstention here. 
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Our focus should not be on whether a federal claim has 
been presented, but rather on the nature of that claim. 
Courts have held almost uniformly, for example, that 
abstention is inappropriate when a federal plaintiff asserts 
a preemption/Supremacy Clause claim. See, e.g., New 
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 491 U.S. at 362-363; Kentucky 
West Va. Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n , 791 
F.2d at 1115-1116; Middle S. Energy, Inc. v. Arkansas Pub. 
Serv. Comm'n, 772 F.2d 404, 417 (8th Cir. 1985); Baggett 
v. Department of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Pilot 
Commissioners, 717 F.2d 521, 524 (11th Cir. 1983); 
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 614 F.2d at 212 n.1. 
This is because "supremacy clause claims are`essentially 
one[s] of federal policy,' so that `the federal courts are 
particularly appropriate bodies for the application of 
preemption principles.' " Kentucky West Va. Gas Co., 791 
F.2d at 1115 (quoting Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 
181, 185 (3d Cir. 1980)). Additionally, we have held that 
abstention is inappropriate in cases in which federal courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction over at least a portion of the 
claims presented. See Riley, 45 F.3d at 773-774 (federal 
court had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiffs' rule 10b-5 
securities claims). 
 
The reasoning that supports the exercise of federal 
question jurisdiction in preemption and exclusive 
jurisdiction cases is not present here. In this case, 
Appellants assert that the Commissioner and the 
Department of Banking and Insurance have overstepped 
their lawful authority in dealing with a substantial and 
complex local concern. Appellants' due process attack on 
the care path regulations requires the same analysis as 
their state law contentions that the regulations are 
arbitrary and capricious.2 Federal court review of 
Appellants' substantive due process argument would 
thereby create a parallel federal regulatory review 
institution. 
 
A reviewing federal court would be required to delve 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Appellants limited their New Jersey court contentions to state law 
under an appropriate reservation. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of 
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). 
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beyond the text of the regulations in order to adjudicate 
Appellants' constitutional claims. It would be required to 
examine the Commissioner's motivations, the Legislature's 
intent, the overarching goal of a reformed no-fault 
insurance law and the processes promulgated regarding 
dispute resolution. These are complex matters of state 
concern that are currently the subject of the appeals before 
the Appellate Division. The regulations can, and should, be 
reviewed by the state court on state law grounds, obviating 
the need to address constitutional questions. See Burford, 
319 U.S. at 333 n.29. 
 
Abstention under Burford is appropriate in this case. The 
district court properly applied the law and did not exceed 
the permissible bounds of discretion when it decided to 
abstain. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
The Court today endorses the proposition that " Burford 
. . . allows a federal court, in fact urges a federal court, to 
decline to exercise jurisdiction when adjudication of 
questions of state law (which can only be done by state 
courts) may avert the need to delve into constitutional 
issues like those presented here." Slip Op. at 7. Specifically, 
the Court holds that because plaintiffs "have presented an 
`arbitrary and capricious' argument to the [state court], 
review by this court . . . would interfere significantly with 
New Jersey's efforts to establish and maintain a coherent 
automobile insurance regulatory policy." Slip Op. at 12. 
 
I do not understand how adjudication of appellants' due 
process and equal protection claims will in any way impair 
New Jersey's ability to maintain a coherent policy. More 
fundamentally, however, the propositions the Court today 
affirms cannot coexist with the well established 
propositions that (1) "exhaustion [of state remedies] is not 
a prerequisite to an action under S 1983," Patsy v. Board of 
Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982), (2) "the opportunity to 
avoid decision of a constitutional question does not alone 
justify abstention by a federal court," Colorado River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 815 n.21 
(1976), (3) "the pendency of an action in the state court is 
no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the 
Federal court having jurisdiction," Colorado River, 424 U.S. 
at 817 (quoting McClelland v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 
(1910)), (4) "there is . . . no doctrine requiring abstention 
merely because resolution of a federal question may result 
in the overturning of state policy," NOPSI v. Council of City 
of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 363 (1989) (quoting Zablocki 
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380 n.5 (1978)), and (5) "Burford 
represents an `extraordinary and narrow exception to the 
duty of [a federal court] to adjudicate a controversy properly 
before it.' " Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 
728 (1996). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
I. 
 
The plaintiffs in this case are chiropractors and 
professional organizations that represent chiropractors both 
 
                                17 
  
in New Jersey and nationally. They challenge the 
constitutionality of certain regulations recently promulgated 
by the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance 
("DOBI"), pursuant to authority granted in the state's 
Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act ("AICRA"). The 
New Jersey legislature enacted AICRA in 1998 in an effort 
to stem the rising cost of private passenger automobile 
insurance in the state. To further this objective, AICRA 
calls for DOBI to promulgate standard professional 
treatment protocols for the diagnosis and treatment of 
common automobile injuries. 
 
Pursuant to authority granted in AICRA, DOBI has 
developed regulations which identify six "care paths" 
associated with back injuries. For each care path, the 
regulations specify the diagnostic procedures and 
treatments for which reimbursement will be required from 
an insurer, without a special showing of medical necessity. 
Reimbursement for other diagnostic procedures and 
treatment is required only if they are shown to be medically 
necessary. The regulations also provide a process for 
resolving disputes about the medical necessity of care that 
deviates from or exceeds the degree of care designated in 
the care paths, culminating in arbitration. 
 
During the period for public comment, the plaintiffs and 
other health care professionals objected that the "care 
paths" were "ill-conceived, detrimental to patient care, and 
dangerous." With few changes to the proposed regulations 
relevant to the chiropractors' concerns, the final regulations 
were adopted on November 30, 1998, to become operative 
on March 22, 1999. 
 
Plaintiffs first filed suit in federal court challenging the 
constitutionality of the regulations. In their First Amended 
Complaint, they allege that the regulations violate the 
plaintiffs' substantive due process, procedural due process, 
and equal protection rights. In support of their substantive 
due process claim, plaintiffs assert that "[t]he care paths 
and arbitration provisions are unreasonable, arbitrary and 
capricious and do not bear a rational relationship to the 
legitimate aim of the enabling legislation." App. at 50. In 
support of their equal protection claim, plaintiffs insist that 
"there is no rational basis for prohibiting chiropractors from 
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providing reimbursable care to patients under care paths 2, 
4, and 6." App. at 51. Finally, in support of their procedural 
due process claim, the complaint alleges that "the 
arbitration provisions contained in the . . . regulations . . . 
deny health care practitioners any practical right to contest 
the medical treatment judgments of the PIP carriers." App. 
at 52. Based on these allegations, plaintiffs requested the 
District Court to declare the regulations dealing with 
chiropractic care unconstitutional and to enjoin their 
implementation insofar as they relate to chiropractic care. 
The plaintiffs' federal complaint is thus limited to claims 
that the final product of the rule making process (i.e., the 
regulations) is in conflict with the United States  
Constitution.1 
 
Shortly after instituting their federal suit, plaintiffs 
sought judicial review of the regulations under state law 
from New Jersey Superior Court's Appellate Division. They 
argued that the DOBI, in promulgating the regulations, 
exceeded the scope of its authority under AICRA. They also 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In support of their substantive due process claim, plaintiffs, after 
asserting that the care paths and arbitration provisions are arbitrary and 
capricious, allege that "the regulations appear to be targeted at 
restricting chiropractic care to accident victims, and they manifest a 
bias 
and bad faith towards chiropractors and accident victims who opt to 
undergo chiropractic care." App. at 50. I read this as further explication 
of the plaintiffs' facial attack on the regulations. The briefing before 
us 
suggests, however, that plaintiffs may wish to argue that the regulations 
are invalid because the rule makers were motivated by bias towards 
chiropractors. While it would not change my view as to the propriety of 
abstention if I believed the District Court would have to delve into the 
subjective intent of the rule makers, I know of no authority for the 
proposition that a substantive due process claim permits a federal court, 
in a case not involving infringement of a fundamental right, to inquire 
into the motive behind state legislative or regulatory rule making. Where 
no fundamental right is implicated, a state law comports with 
substantive due process and must be upheld if it is rationally related to 
a legitimate governmental interest. Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955); Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 
1392, 1403 (3d Cir. 1997). Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 
945 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1991), relied upon by the plaintiffs, dealt with a 
challenge to a refusal to issue a dance hall license, not with a challenge 
to rule making. 
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attacked the process by which the regulations were 
developed, arguing, inter alia, that they "were adopted 
without appropriate consultation with national and state 
standard setting organizations or the applicable state 
professional licensing boards." App. at 86. Consistent with 
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 
411 (1964), plaintiffs expressly "reserve[d] their right to 
pursue federal claims in a previously filed federal court 
action." App. at 86. 
 
The District Court abstained on the basis of Burford v. 
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Plaintiffs ask that we 
reverse the dismissal of their federal suit and remand this 
matter to the District Court for further proceedings, 
including consideration of their application for a 
preliminary injunction. The DOBI asks that we affirm based 
on Burford, or, alternatively, on the Railroad Comm'n of 
Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), or Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800, 
abstention doctrines. I would grant the relief that plaintiffs 
seek. 
 
II. 
 
Because the District Court dismissed plaintiffs' 
complaint, we must take their allegations to be true. See 
Monaghan v. Deakins, 798 F.2d 632 (3d Cir.1986), aff'd in 
part and vacated in part, 484 U.S. 193 (1988). In reviewing 
a District Court's decision to abstain, the underlying legal 
questions are subject to plenary review, although the 
decision to abstain is reviewed for abuse of discretion. "The 
determination of whether this case falls in the area within 
which the district court may exercise discretion is therefore 
a matter of law, reviewable on a plenary basis. Only if we 
determine that the case falls within this range will we apply 
an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the district 
court's decision to abstain." University of Md. v. Peat 
Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
III. 
 
I begin with the Supreme Court's admonition that 
abstention is the "exception and not the rule" and that a 
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federal court's obligation to adjudicate claims within its 
jurisdiction is "virtually unflagging." University of Md., 923 
F.2d at 271, (quoting NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359). As the 
Supreme Court recently reiterated, federal courts 
 
       have no more right to decline the exercise of 
       jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is 
       not given. The one or the other would be treason to the 
       Constitution. [T]he courts of the United States are 
       bound to proceed to judgment and to afford redress to 
       suitors before them in every case to which their 
       jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their 
       authority or duty in any case in favor of another 
       jurisdiction. When a Federal court is properly appealed 
       to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is 
       its duty to take such jurisdiction. . . . The right of a 
       party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is 
       a choice cannot be properly denied. 
 
NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 358-59 (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 
A District Court may abstain in a case in which it has 
jurisdiction only if that case falls within one of the four, 
very narrow, exceptions articulated in Burford, Pullman, 
Younger, and Colorado River. To preserve the general rule, 
courts have delineated the contours of these limited 
exceptions and provided specific elements for each. I believe 
that the majority's approach unnecessarily blurs the lines 
dividing the exceptions -- most notably between the Burford 
and Pullman exceptions -- and thereby establishes a 
precedent that takes a substantial step toward creating the 
proverbial "exception that swallowed the rule." I believe that 
fidelity to the general rule obliging federal courts to exercise 
their jurisdiction requires a careful analysis of each 
doctrine's applicability. That analysis leads me to conclude 
that none of the abstention exceptions are applicable here. 
 
IV. 
 
The Supreme Court has summarized the Burford doctrine 
as follows: 
 
       Where timely and adequate state court review is 
       available, a federal court sitting in equity must decline 
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       to interfere with the proceedings or orders of state 
       administrative agencies: (1) when there are "difficult 
       questions of state law bearing on policy problems of 
       substantial public import whose importance 
       transcends the result in the case at bar"; or (2) where 
       "the exercise of federal review of the question in a case 
       and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts 
       to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter 
       of substantial public concern." 
 
NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 361. 
 
I agree with my colleagues that timely and adequate state 
court review has been available to plaintiffs. They have no 
duty to exhaust their state remedies before pressing 
forward with their S 1983 claims in the federal court, 
however, and this is true even though such exhaustion 
might relieve a federal court of the burden of resolving a 
constitutional issue in the S 1983 case. See Patsy, 457 U.S. 
at 515; Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236- 
37 (1984); Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 882 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
The District Court found, and appellees contend, that 
abstention was appropriate here under the second prong of 
the Burford doctrine -- i.e., because federal review would 
disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent policy on a 
matter of substantial public concern. 
 
There is no dispute in this case that the legislative 
scheme reflected in AICRA and the implementing 
regulations constitutes a complex regulatory scheme 
covering a subject matter in which the state has very 
important interests. It is also indisputable that a federal 
court declaration in this case that these regulations violate 
the federal constitution and an injunction preventing their 
implementation would disrupt this state regulatory scheme. 
These undisputed facts do not alone make Burford 
abstention appropriate, however. "While Burford is 
concerned with protecting state administrative processes 
from undue federal interference, it does not require 
abstention whenever there exists such a process . . . ." 
NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 362. And "there is, of course, no 
doctrine requiring abstention merely because resolution of 
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a federal question may result in the overturning of a state 
policy." Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 379-80 n.5. 
 
Burford is thus not directed to the disruption that comes 
from a one-time federal declaration that a state program is 
unconstitutional. As the above quoted portion of NOPSI 
indicates, it is concerned rather with cases in which a 
federal court will be called upon to resolve issues involving 
policy judgments that should be reserved for state officials 
who gain special competence from administering and 
developing the regulatory process. As then judge, now 
Justice Breyer explained in a very similar context in Bath 
Mem. Hosp. v. Maine Health and Fin. Comm'n, 853 F.2d 
1007 (1st Cir. 1988), the threat to which Burford is directed 
is an "institutional" one: 
 
       Federal courts abstained in Burford, and in similar 
       cases, such as [Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n v. S. Ry. 
       Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951)] and [Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
       Sabbagh, 603 F.2d 228 (1st Cir. 1979)] when they 
       feared that excessive federal court intervention 
       unnecessarily threatened to impede significantly the 
       ongoing administration of a state regulatory system. 
       The threatened interference did not consist merely of 
       the threat that the federal court might declare the 
       entire state system unconstitutional; that sort of risk is 
       present whenever one attacks a state law on 
       constitutional grounds in a federal court. Rather, in 
       our view, abstention in the Burford line of cases rested 
       upon the threat to the proper administration of a 
       constitutional state regulatory system. The threat was 
       that the federal court might, in the context of the state 
       regulatory scheme, create a parallel, additional, federal, 
       `regulatory review' mechanism, the existence of which 
       would significantly increase the difficulty of 
       administering the state regulatory scheme. It was this 
       special and unusual "institutional threat" that, in our 
       view, led the federal courts to abstain. 
 
        To be more specific, in Burford, the plaintiff, invoking 
       diversity jurisdiction, asked a federal court to decide 
       that, as a matter of state law, it was entitled to a state 
       oil permit that would have given it a right to remove oil 
       through its wells from a field where large numbers of 
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       other producers also had wells. A state agency, the 
       Texas Railroad Commission, was in charge of deciding 
       just who could withdraw what oil from a commonly 
       drilled field, a highly technical question, and one of 
       great local importance, for the Texas Railroad 
       Commission, through this regulation, sought to impose 
       restrictions on supply that would keep interstate oil 
       prices high. . . . Because of the need, in terms of both 
       economics and equity, to achieve a consistent set of 
       decisions (and the fact that changing economic 
       conditions could require rapidly changing decisions) 
       the state statute had centralized all judicial review in a 
       single Texas state court. As the Supreme Court pointed 
       out, in these circumstances, the presence of a federal 
       court as an independent forum of review for individual 
       licensing decisions based on a balancing of factually- 
       based local interests created a risk of inconsistency 
       (between diversity cases and others) that could have 
       threatened the viability of the Texas regulatory scheme. 
 
Bath, 853 F.2d at 1013-14 (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
 
Here, as in Bath, the "plaintiffs do not seek individualized 
review of fact . . . specific regulatory decision making. To 
the contrary, they attack the [regulations] as [they are] 
written. . . . Review here would not threaten to create in the 
federal court a parallel regulatory review institution. The 
risks of interference here seem no greater than those 
present whenever a federal court decides whether a state 
regulatory statute is constitutional." Id. at 1014-15. 
 
If we were to allow the District Court to proceed in this 
matter, it would be called upon, insofar as the substantive 
due process and equal protection claims are concerned, to 
do nothing more (and nothing less) than look at the text of 
the regulation and ask whether a rational rule maker could 
possibly conclude that the challenged provisions would in 
some way serve the legitimate governmental interest 
identified by the state in response to the challenge. See 
United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 422 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(equal protection); Alexander, 114 F.3d at 1406 (substantive 
due process). This extremely deferential rational basis 
review is deliberately designed to constrain a federal court 
 
                                24 
  
from resolving an issue of state policy -- if the court can 
conceive of any rational basis for the policy choice made in 
the challenged regulatory provision there is no 
constitutional violation and the case is over. 
 
With respect to plaintiffs' procedural due process claim, 
the District Court would be called upon to determine 
whether the arbitration process provides a fair opportunity 
for health care practitioners to contest the medical 
treatment judgments of the PIP carrier. Again, this would 
involve examining facially the procedure provided to 
determine whether it comports with the minimum 
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 325 
(1976). I fail to see how performing this task will in any way 
"be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy 
with respect to a matter of substantial public concern." 
NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 361. 
 
While the claims in this case and the state proceeding are 
distinct, they do deal with the same subject matter and it 
is conceivable that the Appellate Division may consider 
arguments and issues similar to those that will be involved 
here. We have clearly held, however, that parallel 
proceedings dealing with the same subject matter are not a 
basis for abstention. Marks, 19 F.3d at 881. Burford is 
implicated only when there are issues that the federal court 
would have to resolve in the federal proceeding that should 
be reserved for a state tribunal having special competence 
to resolve them. The issues here are conventional 
challenges based on the federal constitution, and the 
Appellate Division, while as competent, is no more 
competent than the District Court to resolve those issues.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Court distinguishes the closely analogous Bath case on the 
ground that plaintiffs here "attack [on due process and equal protection 
grounds] only discrete portions of regulations promulgated by the 
Commissioner, not the legislature." Slip Op. at 14. It fails to explain, 
however, how adjudication of the constitutional issues here posed to the 
District Court would be any more disruptive of the state's ability to 
develop coherent policy than adjudication of the issues presented to the 
federal court in Bath. 
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V. 
 
In Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 
1996), we explained Pullman abstention as follows: 
 
       Under our jurisprudence, a district court must make 
       three findings in order to justify the Pullman exception 
       to the general rule that federal courts must hear cases 
       properly brought within their jurisdiction. The Court 
       must find (1) that uncertain issues of state law underlie 
       the federal constitutional claims brought in the district 
       court; (2) that the state law issues are amenable to a 
       state court interpretation that would obviate the need 
       for, or substantially narrow, adjudication of the federal 
       claim; and (3) that important state policies would be 
       disrupted through a federal court's erroneous 
       construction of state law. If all three factors are 
       present, the federal court must then consider whether 
       abstention is appropriate by weighing such factors as 
       the availability of an adequate state remedy, the length 
       of time the litigation has been pending, and the impact 
       of delay on the litigants. 
 
Artway, 81 F.3d at 1270 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
 
Thus, Pullman abstention is applicable only in the narrow 
category of cases in which a federal court will have to 
determine an uncertain issue of state law in the course of 
reaching a federal constitutional issue and important state 
policies would be frustrated should the federal court err in 
deciding that issue. While DOBI repeats many times in its 
brief that the federal court here would have to interpret the 
statute and the regulations, it has not identified a single 
specific issue of state law that is both unclear and relevant 
to the issues the federal court has been asked to address. 
Pullman abstention, accordingly, would be inappropriate 
here. 
 
Were it true, as the Court suggests, that Burford allows 
a federal court to decline to exercise jurisdiction whenever 
a state court's decision might "avert the need to delve into 
constitutional issues," slip op. at 7, Pullman abstention 
would serve no purpose. One would never need to ask 
whether there are unclear questions of state law, the 
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resolution of which would be material to the constitutional 
issues presented in the federal proceeding. Burford 
abstention would be appropriate even in the absence of 
such issues. 
 
VI. 
 
In Frank Russell Co. v. Wellington Mgmt., 154 F.3d 97, 
106 (3d Cir. 1998), we summarized Younger as 
"prohibit[ing]" a "federal court from enjoining an on-going 
state action" if "(1) there is an on-going state judicial 
proceeding; (2) the state proceeding implicates an important 
state interest, and (3) the state proceeding provides an 
adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional issue." As 
we said in Marks, however, "while a proponent of 
abstention must show [these three circumstances exist], 
such a showing does not require that the federal court 
abstain." Marks, 19 F.3d at 882 (emphasis supplied). 
 
The teachings of Marks are helpful here. First, Marks 
explains that the key to Younger abstention is not the 
presence of parallel state proceedings, but rather the 
likelihood that the federal action will interfere with the 
ongoing state proceedings. "This is true even in cases where 
there exists a `potential for conflict in the results of 
adjudications.' " Id. at 882 (quoting Colorado River, 424 
U.S. at 816). After all, as Marks reminds, "[a] federal 
plaintiff may pursue parallel actions in the state and 
federal courts so long as the plaintiff does not seek relief in 
the federal court that would interfere with the state judicial 
process." Id. at 885. 
 
Even though the plaintiffs in Marks sought injunctive 
relief from the federal court, abstention under Younger was 
not justified. As we explained, 
 
       [Marks was] not a case in which the federal plaintiffs 
       are seeking relief which will in any way impair the 
       ability of the state courts of Pennsylvania to adjudicate 
       anything that is currently before them. When [Marks'] 
       suit was filed, plaintiffs . . . had instituted two 
       proceedings challenging the election, both of which 
       were then before the Court of Common Pleas. The 
       federal suit did not directly or indirectly ask the court 
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       for any relief with respect to those state proceedings. 
       The plaintiffs were simply pursuing parallel tracks 
       seeking consistent relief in the federal and state 
       systems. 
 
Id. at 884. The same is true here. Plaintiffs do not seek to 
enjoin a state judicial proceeding or to enjoin enforcement 
of a state judicial decree. Younger abstention would thus 
violate the District Court's duty to resolve federal claims. 
 
VII. 
 
The "threshold inquiry that must be decided in any 
Colorado River abstention case is whether the two actions 
are `parallel.' " Ryan v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 
1997). If they are not, the District Court lacks the power to 
abstain. "Generally, cases are parallel when they involve the 
same parties and claims." As we explained in Trent v. Dial 
Med. of Fla., Inc., "it is important that only truly duplicative 
proceedings be avoided. When the claims, parties or 
requested relief differ, deference may not be appropriate." 
Trent, 33 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Complaint 
of Bankers Trust Co. v. Chatterjie, 636 F.2d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 
1980)). 
 
The state and federal proceedings here are not parallel. 
As I have explained, the state proceeding involves only state 
law challenges to the regulations, while the federal 
proceeding involves only federal constitutional issues. As a 
result, Colorado River abstention is inapposite here. 
 
VIII. 
 
The District Court had an obligation to entertain and 
resolve plaintiffs' constitutional claims. It lacked authority 
to abstain. Accordingly, I would reverse its order of 
dismissal and remand this case for proceedings, including 
prompt consideration of plaintiffs' application for a 
preliminary injunction. 
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